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Abstract:  
In this paper I argue that the current core of macroeconomics—by which I mainly mean the 
so-called dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach—has become so mesmerized with its 
own internal logic that it has begun to confuse the precision it has achieved about its own world 
with the precision that it has about the real one. This is dangerous for both methodological and 
policy reasons. On the methodology front, macroeconomic research has been in “fine-tuning” 
mode within the local-maximum of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium world, when we 
should be in “broad-exploration” mode. We are too far from absolute truth to be so specialized 
and to make the kind of confident quantitative claims that often emerge from the core. On the 
policy front, this confused precision creates the illusion that a minor adjustment in the standard 
policy framework will prevent future crises, and by doing so it leaves us overly exposed to the 
new and unexpected.  
Keywords: Pretense of knowledge, DSGE, core and periphery of macroeconomics, 
financial crisis, complexity, robust control, uncertainty, rational expectations 
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The recent financial crisis has damaged the reputation of macroeconomics, largely for its 
inability to predict the impending financial and economic crisis. To be honest, this inability to 
predict does not concern me much. It is almost tautological that severe crises are essentially 
unpredictable, for otherwise they would not cause such a high degree of distress. Of course, it is 
well-known that certain elements can increase the fragility of a financial system, such as high 
levels of leverage or mismatches between short-term liabilities and long-term assets, and that 
these issues may justify policy intervention. But knowing these mechanisms is quite different 
from arguing that a severe crisis can be predicted.  Modern Cassandras will always claim to have 
seen the crisis coming. What they will not say is how many times they saw things coming that 
never materialized, or how the specific mechanisms behind the crisis are different from those on 
which their predictions were based. In my view, the conviction that one can foretell a severe 
crisis in advance is mostly a manifestation of pareidolia—the psychological phenomenon that 
makes people see faces and animals in clouds and the like. 
What does concern me of my discipline, however, is that its current core—by which I 
mainly mean the so-called dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach—has become so 
mesmerized with its own internal logic that it has begun to confuse the precision it has achieved 
about its own world with the precision that it has about the real one. This is dangerous for both 
methodological and policy reasons. On the methodology front, macroeconomic research has 
been in “fine-tuning” mode within the local-maximum of the dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium world, when we should be in “broad-exploration” mode. We are too far from 
absolute truth to be so specialized and to make the kind of confident quantitative claims that 
often emerge from the core. On the policy front, this confused precision creates the illusion that a 
minor adjustment in the standard policy framework will prevent future crises, and by doing so it 
leaves us overly exposed to the new and unexpected.  
To be fair to our field, an enormous amount of work at the intersection of macroeconomics 
and corporate finance has been chasing many of the issues that played a central role during the 
current crisis, including liquidity evaporation, collateral shortages, bubbles, crises, panics, fire 
sales, risk-shifting, contagion, and the like.1  However, much of this literature belongs to the 
periphery of macroeconomics rather than to its core. Is the solution then to replace the current 
core for the periphery?  I am tempted—but I think this would address only some of our 
problems. The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium strategy is so attractive, and even plain 
addictive, because it allows one to generate impulse responses that can be fully described in 
terms of seemingly scientific statements. The model is an irresistible snake-charmer. In contrast, 
the periphery is not nearly as ambitious, and it provides mostly qualitative insights. So we are 
                                                            
1 (In fact, at MIT we divide the first‐year Ph.D. macroeconomics sequence into four parts: methods, 
growth, fluctuations, and crises.) I will include specific references of this work in the main text, but see 
Part VI of Tirole (2006) for a nice survey and unified explanation of several of these mechanisms.  
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left with the tension between a type of answer to which we aspire but that has limited connection 
with reality (the core) and more sensible but incomplete answers (the periphery).  
This distinction between core and periphery is not a matter of freshwater versus saltwater 
economics. Both the real business cycle approach and its New Keynesian counterpart belong to 
the core. Moreover, there was a time when Keynesian economics was more like the current core, 
in the sense of trying to build quantitative aggregative models starting from micro-founded 
consumption functions and the like. At that time, it was the “rational-expectations” 
representatives that were in the insight-building mode, identifying key concepts for 
macroeconomic policy such as time-inconsistency and endogenous expectations, without any 
pretense of being realistic in all dimensions of modeling in order to obtain quantitative answers.  
Moreover, this tension is not new to macroeconomics or even to economics more broadly. In 
his Nobel-prize acceptance lecture, Hayek writes: “Of course, compared with the precise 
predictions we have learnt to expect in the physical sciences, this sort of mere pattern predictions 
is a second best with which one does not like to have to be content. Yet the danger of which I 
want to warn is precisely the belief that in order to have a claim to be accepted as scientific it is 
necessary to achieve more. This way lies charlatanism and worse. To act on the belief that we 
possess the knowledge and the power which enable us to shape the process of society entirely to 
our liking, knowledge which in fact we do not possess, is likely to make us do much harm” (von 
Hayek, 1974). 
One reading of Hayek's comment is as a reminder of the dangers of presuming a precision 
and degree of knowledge we do not have. I suspect that if Hayek was confronted with the limited 
choice between the core or the periphery of macroeconomics, his vote today would be cast for 
the periphery. This is the starting point of the theme I will develop in the first part of the paper. 
There I will discuss the distinction between the core and the periphery of macroeconomics in 
greater detail, as well as the futile nature of the integrationist movement—that is, the process of 
gradually bringing the insights of the periphery into the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
structure.  
However, when we consider Hayek’s comment, we find a silver lining: a contemporary 
version of his paragraph, which would involve a discussion of the core and periphery, would 
confront one modeling approach against other modeling approaches, not models against 
narrative. This is good news. There is no doubt that the formalization of macroeconomics over 
recent decades has increased its potential. We just need to be careful to not let this formalization 
gain its own life and distract us from the ultimate goal, which is to understand the mechanisms 
that drive the real economy. This progress also offers hope that we may find ways to explore 
formally and explicitly the limits of our and economic agents' knowledge.  This is the second 
theme I develop in this paper. The idea is to place at the center of the analysis the fact that the 
complexity of macroeconomic interactions limits the knowledge we can ever attain. In thinking 
about analytical tools and macroeconomic policies, we should seek those that are robust to the 
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enormous uncertainty to which we are confined, and we should consider what this complexity 
does to the actions and reactions of the economic agents whose behavior we are supposed to be 
capturing. 
I cannot be sure that shifting resources from the current core to the periphery and 
focusing on the effects of (very) limited knowledge on our modeling strategy and on the actions 
of the economic agents we are supposed to model is the best next step. However, I am almost 
certain that if the goal of macroeconomics is to provide formal frameworks to address real 
economic problems rather than purely literature-driven ones, we better start trying something 
new rather soon. The alternative of segmenting, with academic macroeconomics playing its 
internal games and leaving the real world problems mostly to informal commentators and 
“policy” discussions, is not very attractive either, for the latter often suffer from an even deeper 
pretense-of-knowledge syndrome than do academic macroeconomists.  
 
Core and Periphery 
The ultimate goal of macroeconomics is to explain and model the (simultaneous) 
aggregate outcomes that arise from the decisions made by multiple and heterogeneous economic 
agents interacting through complex relationships and markets. Neither the core nor the periphery 
is able to address this incredibly ambitious goal very satisfactorily. The periphery has focused on 
the details of the subproblems and mechanisms but has downplayed distant and complex general 
equilibrium interactions. The core has focused on (extremely stylized) versions of the general 
equilibrium interactions and has downplayed the subproblems.  
The natural next step for the core, many would argue, is to add gradually the insights of the 
periphery into its dynamic stochastic general equilibrium structure. I am much less optimistic 
about this strategy, as I think it is plagued by internal inconsistencies and pretense-of-knowledge 
problems.   
  
The Periphery 
I believe that up to now the insight-building mode (both past and present) of the 
periphery of macroeconomics has proven to be more useful than the macro-machine-building 
mode of the core to help our understanding of significant macroeconomic events. For example, 
in the context of the current financial and economic crisis, the periphery gave us frameworks to 
understand phenomena such as speculative bubbles, leverage cycles, fire sales, flight to quality, 
margin- and collateral-constraint spirals, liquidity runs, and so on—phenomena that played a 
central role in bringing the world economy to the brink of a severe depression. This literature 
also provided the basis for the policy framework that was used to contain the crisis. All in all, I 
believe it would be good for macroeconomics to (re)orient a larger share of its human capital in 
this direction, not just for the study of crises but also for its broader concerns. 
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 Yet the periphery of macroeconomics is defined not only by its subjects, but also, and 
perhaps even more so, by a methodological decision which makes its goals narrower than those 
of the core. The methodology of the periphery is designed to isolate insights (as micro-theory 
does), and research on these topics does not typically display the aspiration to provide 
comprehensive answers―let alone quantitative answers―to the overall effects on the 
macroeconomy. It is only natural for macroeconomists to want more, but it is the rushed process 
to fulfill this ambition that I believe has led the core right into Hayek’s pretense-of-knowledge 
syndrome.  
 
The Core 
 
The core approach to macroeconomics, as it is taught in most graduate programs and as it 
appears in leading journals, begins with a neoclassical growth model. This model is then 
developed into a stochastic form. The early versions were called “real” business cycles, because 
the key shocks occurred to technology. In the basic real business cycle approach, households 
make optimizing decisions in equating their marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
and leisure to the real wage, which in the basic model is determined by the marginal product of 
labor. Households also make optimizing decisions in the choice between consumption and 
saving, where in this case the maximizing condition involves setting the household’s marginal 
rate of substitution between present and future consumption equal to the rate of return, which in 
the basic model is determined by the rate of return that firms receive on investment. Firms 
optimize their use of labor and capital according to a production function. The standard approach 
in macroeconomics is then to add to this core model a few ingredients. For example, in this 
journal, Galí and Gertler (2007) build up a model of this sort and then add money, monopolistic 
competition (and price mark-ups), and nominal price rigidities. Variants of this model have 
become the workhorse model in research departments of central banks.  In this symposium, the 
papers by Ohanian and Hall also take this general approach of starting with a real business cycle 
model and then discussing how it might be adapted to capture the key elements of the financial 
crisis.  
If we were to stop there, and simply use these stylized structures as just one more tool to 
understand a piece of the complex problem, and to explore some potentially perverse general 
equilibrium effect which could affect the insights isolated in the periphery, then I would be fine 
with it. My problems start when these structures are given life on their own, and researchers 
choose to "take the model seriously" (a statement that signals the time to leave a seminar, for it is 
always followed by a sequence of naive and surreal claims).  
The quantitative implications of this core approach, which are built on supposedly “micro-
founded” calibrations of key parameters, are definitely on the surreal side.  Take for example the 
preferred “microfoundation” of the supply of capital in the workhorse models of the core 
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approach. A key parameter to calibrate in these models is the intertemporal substitution elasticity 
of a representative agent, which is to be estimated from micro-data. A whole literature develops 
around this estimation, which narrows the parameter to certain values, which are then to be used 
and honored by anyone wanting to say something about “modern” macroeconomics. This 
parameter may be a reasonable estimate for an individual agent facing a specific micro decision, 
but what does it have to do with the aggregate? What happened with the role of Chinese 
bureaucrats, Gulf autocrats, and the like, in the supply of capital? A typical answer is not to 
worry about it, because this is all “as if.” But then, why do we call this strategy microfoundations 
rather than reduced-form?  
My point is that by some strange herding process the core of macroeconomics seems to 
transform things that may have been useful modeling short-cuts into a part of a new and artificial 
“reality,” and now suddenly everyone uses the same language, which in the next iteration gets 
confused with, and eventually replaces, reality. Along the way, this process of make-believe 
substitution raises our presumption of knowledge about the workings of a complex economy, and 
increases the risks of a “pretense of knowledge” about which Hayek warned us.  
 After much trial and error, these core models have managed to generate reasonable 
numbers for quantities during plain-vanilla, second-order business cycle fluctuations. However, 
the structural interpretation attributed to these results is often naïve at best, and more often is 
worse than that. For example, while these models have been successful in matching some 
aggregate quantities, they have done much more poorly on prices. But in what sense is it a good 
general equilibrium fit if the quantities are right but not the prices?   
Incidentally, this process of selective measures of success also weakens the initial 
motivation for building the microfoundations of macroeconomics, which is to make the theory 
testable. A theory is no longer testable when rejection is used not to discard the theory, but to 
select the data moments under which the core model is to be judged. This practice means that 
well-known major failures just become “puzzles,” which are soon presumed to be orthogonal to 
the output from the quantitative model that is to be taken “seriously.”2   
 But isn’t abstraction what good economic models are about, for only then can we isolate 
the essence of our concerns? Yes, but with certain requirements to which I think the core has 
failed to adhere, yet the periphery has gotten mostly right.  
                                                            
2  In a similar spirit, but applied to ad‐hoc dynamics models, Lucas (2003) writes: “There’s an interesting 
footnote  in Patinkin’s book. Milton Friedman had told him that the rate of change of price  in any one 
market ought to depend on excess demand and supply  in all markets  in the system. Patinkin  is happy 
about  this  suggestion because he  loves more generality, but  if  you  think about Friedman’s  review of 
Lange, of Lange’s book, what Friedman must have been trying to tell Patinkin is that he thinks the theory 
is empty, that anything can happen in this model. And I think he’s got a point. ”   
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The periphery uses abstraction to remove the inessential, but a typical periphery paper is 
very careful that the main object of study is anchored by sensible assumptions. It is fine to be as 
“goofy” as needed to make things simpler along inessential dimensions, but it is important not to 
sound “funny” on the specific issue that is to be addressed. 
 Instead, core macroeconomics often has aimed not for a realistic anchor and a 
simplification of the rest, but for being only half-“goofy” on everything:  preferences and 
production functions that do not represent anyone but that could be found in an introductory 
microeconomics textbook, the same for markets, and so on. By now, there are a whole set of 
conventions and magic parameter values resulting in an artificial world that can be analyzed with 
the rigor of micro-theory but that speaks of no particular real-world issue with any reliability. 
 
 
Integration?  
 
One possible reaction to my sarcastic remarks is that I am too impatient; that with enough 
time, we will arrive at an El Dorado of macroeconomics where the key insights of the periphery 
are incorporated into a massive dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.   After all, there 
has been an enormous collective effort in recent decades in building such models, with an 
increasing number of bells and whistles representing various microeconomic frictions. The 
research departments of central banks around the world have become even more obsessed than 
academics with this agenda.  
However, I think this incremental strategy may well have overshot its peak and may lead 
us to a minimum rather than a maximum in terms of capturing realistic macroeconomic 
phenomena.  We are digging ourselves, one step at a time, deeper and deeper into a Fantasyland, 
with economic agents who can solve richer and richer stochastic general equilibrium problems 
containing all sorts of frictions.  Because the “progress” is gradual, we do not seem to notice as 
we accept what are increasingly absurd behavioral conventions and stretch the intelligence and 
information of underlying economic agents to levels that render them unrecognizable.  
The beauty of the simplest barebones real business cycle model is, in fact, in its 
simplicity. It is a coherent description of equilibrium in a frictionless world, where it is 
reasonable to expect that humans can deal with its simplicity. I would rather stop there (perhaps 
with space for adding one nominal rigidity) and simply acknowledge that it is a benchmark, not a 
shell or a steppingstone for everything we study in macroeconomics, which is unfortunately the 
way the core treats it today.3  
                                                            
3 An extreme form of this view of the real business cycle model as the steppingstone for everything else is the so‐ 
called “gap approach,” which essentially views and constrains the research agenda of macroeconomics to studying 
the  failures of  the maximization  conditions of  this  very particular model  (Chari, Kehoe,  and McGrattan,  2007). 
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Since the periphery is about isolating specific mechanisms, it surrounds the sources of 
these mechanisms with assumptions designed to kill unwanted effects that would pollute the 
message.  It might seem as if the natural process to build a quantitative answer for the whole 
would start with bringing back some of the realistic unwanted effects that were removed for 
analytic convenience, and to model the interactions and complexities that arise from the 
simultaneous presence of all these parts. But instead, the current core approach of 
macroeconomics preserves many of the original convenience-assumptions from the research on 
the periphery and then obsesses with “closing” the model by adding artificial factor supply 
constraints (note that the emphasis is on the word artificial, not on the word constraints). All that 
we learn from this exercise is what these artificial constraints do to the stylized mechanisms, not 
what these mechanisms can do to the whole in a realistic setting, which should be our goal.4 We 
need to stop this practice, at least as a norm, even if the cost is that we can’t make welfare 
statements with the same degree of confidence that a fully structural model would allow us to 
do—it would be a false pretense of knowledge anyway.   
Moreover, the process of bringing the periphery into the core raises an obvious tension 
about the role of rational expectations. Rational expectations is a central ingredient of the current 
core; however, this assumption becomes increasingly untenable as we continue to add the 
realism of the periphery into the core.5  While it often makes sense to assume rational 
expectations for a limited application to isolate a particular mechanism that is distinct from the 
role of expectations formation, this assumption no longer makes sense once we assemble the 
whole model. Agents could be fully rational with respect to their local environments and 
everyday activities, but they are most probably nearly clueless with respect to the statistics about 
which current macroeconomic models expect them to have full information and rational 
information.  
This issue is not one that can be addressed by adding a parameter capturing a little bit 
more risk aversion about macroeconomic, rather than local, phenomena.  The reaction of human 
beings to the truly unknown is fundamentally different from the way they deal with the risks 
associated with a known situation and environment (Knight, 1921; Ellsberg, 1961). In realistic, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Again, there  is nothing wrong with this approach as a test of the workings of that particular model; the problem 
arises when it becomes a benchmark for something beyond that specific goal. 
4 It is not rare to find in the literature that some mechanism is called irrelevant because it is killed by the artificial 
constraints  of  the  core. However,  in many  instances  that  can  be  corroborated  by  data,  such  results  are  really 
indictments of the artificial constraints, not of the mechanisms.   
 
5 Of course, part of the realism added to the core could come from reducing the IQ of its agents. An important line 
of recent work started by Sims (2003) attempts to acknowledge human beings’ computational capacity constraints 
by building on Shannon’s (1948) information theory work. However, much of this work has taken place within the 
context of  the  current  core models of macroeconomics, and hence  it  still  trivializes  the environment economic 
agents have to confront.  
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real-time settings, both economic agents and researchers have a very limited understanding of the 
mechanisms at work. This is an order-of-magnitude less knowledge than our core 
macroeconomic models currently assume, and hence it is highly likely that the optimal 
approximation paradigm is quite different from current workhorses, both for academic and 
policy work. In trying to add a degree of complexity to the current core models, by bringing in 
aspects of the periphery, we are simultaneously making the rationality assumptions behind that 
core approach less plausible.  
Moreover, this integrationist strategy does not come with an assurance that it will take us 
to the right place, as there is an enormous amount of path dependence in the process by which 
elements are incorporated into the core; and the baggage we are already carrying has the 
potential to distort the selection of the mechanisms of the periphery that are incorporated. Given 
the enormous complexity of the task at hand, we can spend an unacceptably long time wandering 
in surrealistic worlds before gaining any traction into reality. 
We ultimately need to revisit the ambitious goal of the core, of having a framework for 
understanding the whole, from shocks to transmission channels, all of them interacting with each 
other.  The issue is how to do this without over-trivializing the workings of the economy (in the 
fundamental sense of overestimating the power of our approximations) to a degree that makes 
the framework useless as a tool for understanding significant events and dangerous for policy 
guidance. I don't have the answer to this fundamental dilemma, but it does point in the direction 
of much more diversification of research and methodology than we currently accept. It also 
points in the direction of embracing, rather than sweeping under the rug, the complexity of the 
macroeconomic environment. I turn to the latter theme next. 
 
Facing and Embracing Economic Complexity 
  
I suspect that embracing rather than fighting complexity and what it does to our modeling 
would help us make progress in understanding macroeconomic events.  One of the weaknesses 
of the core stems from going too directly from statements about individuals to statements about 
the aggregate, where the main difference between the two comes from stylized aggregate 
constraints and trivial interactions, rather than from the richness and unpredictability of the 
linkages among the parts.  We need to spend much more time modeling and understanding the 
topology of linkages among agents, markets, institutions, and countries.  
By embracing complexity I do not mean the direct importation of the models from the 
formal complexity literature in the physical sciences, as economics is, and is likely to remain, 
fundamentally reductionist (that is, it seeks to understand the behavior of the whole from that of 
the parts). The nodes of economic models are special, for they contain agents with frontal lobes 
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who can both strategize and panic, and it is these features that introduce much of the 
unpredictability in the linkages I mentioned earlier.6 
Having said this, some of the motivations for the econophysics literature do strike a chord 
with the task ahead for macroeconomists. For example, Albert and Barabási (2002), in 
advocating for the use of statistical mechanics tools for complex networks, write:   
 
Physics, a major beneficiary of reductionism, has developed an arsenal of successful tools 
for predicting the behavior of a system as a whole from the properties of its constituents. We 
now understand how magnetism emerges from the collective behavior of millions of spins . . 
. The success of these modeling efforts is based on the simplicity of the interactions between 
the elements: there is no ambiguity as to what interacts with what, and the interaction 
strength is uniquely determined by the physical distance. We are at a loss, however, to 
describe systems for which physical distance is irrelevant or for which there is ambiguity as 
to whether two components interact . . . there is an increasingly voiced need to move beyond 
reductionist approaches and try to understand the behavior of the system as a whole. Along 
this route, understanding the topology of the interactions between the components, i.e., 
networks, is unavoidable . . . 
 
In any event, I will not review this literature here and instead will focus on arguments about 
cumbersome linkages and agents' confusion about these linkages that are closer to mainstream 
macroeconomics.  
 
Dominoes and Avalanches 
 
Allen and Gale’s (2000) model of financial networks and the inherent fragility of some of 
these structures provided an early and elegant example of how linkages can cause substantial 
instability with respect to shocks different from those the network was designed to handle.  
Recently, Shin (2009) shows how fire sales can greatly magnify the domino mechanism 
highlighted by Allen and Gale (2000). Another example of promising research in this style is 
Rotemberg (2009), which uses graph theory to study how interconnectedness affects firms’ 
ability to make use of an exogenous amount of liquidity. Rotemberg studies a situation in which 
all firms are solvent; that is, “the payments that any particular firm is expected to make do not 
                                                            
6 Durlauf (2004) offers a thoughtful survey and discussion of the econophysics literature and its limitations for 
economic policy analysis, precisely because it “does not use models that adequately respect the purposefulness of 
individual behavior.” This of course is a statement of the current state of affairs in the literature, not of its 
potential, which is probably substantial. See Bak, Chen, Scheinkman, and Woodford (1993), Sheinkman and 
Woodford (1994), Arthur, Durlauf, and Lane (1997), Durlauf (1993, 1997), Brock (1993), Brock and Durlauf (2001), 
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz‐Zalehi (2010) for early steps in this direction. 
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exceed the payments it is entitled to receive.”  He finds that interconnectedness can exacerbate 
“the difficulties that firms have in meeting their obligations in periods where liquidity is more 
difficult to obtain.”   
Of course, the complex-systems literature itself offers fascinating examples of the power 
of interconnectedness. Bak, Chen, Scheinkman, and Woodford. (1992) and Sheinkman and 
Woodford (1994) bring methods and metaphors from statistical mechanics to macroeconomics. 
They argue that local, nonlinear interactions can allow small idiosyncratic shocks to generate 
large aggregate fluctuations, rather than washing out via the law of large numbers.  They discuss 
a kind of macroeconomic instability called “self-organized criticality,” comparing the economy 
to a sand hill: at first, a tiny grain of sand dropped on the hill causes no aggregate effect, but as 
the slope of the hill increases, eventually one grain of sand can be sufficient to cause an 
avalanche. In the limit, aggregate fluctuations may emerge from hard-to-detect and purely 
idiosyncratic shocks. 
 
Panics 
 
In a complex environment, agents need to make decisions based on information that is 
astonishingly limited relative to all the things that are going on and that have the potential to 
percolate through the system. This degree of ignorance is not something agents with frontal lobes 
like to face. Anxiety is also part of the frontal lobe domain! Reactions that include anxiety and 
even panic are key ingredients for macroeconomic crises.  
Put differently, a complex environment has an enormous potential to generate truly 
confusing surprises. This fact of life needs to be made an integral part of macroeconomic 
modeling and policymaking.  Reality is immensely more complex than models, with millions of 
potential weak links. After a crisis has occurred, it is relatively easy to highlight the link that 
blew up, but before the crisis, it is a different matter. All market participants and policymakers 
know their own local world, but understanding all the possible linkages across these different 
worlds is too complex. The extent to which the lack of understanding of the full network matters 
to economic agents varies over the cycle.  The importance of this lack of understanding is at its 
most extreme level during financial crises, when seemingly irrelevant and distant linkages are 
perceived to be relevant. Moreover, this change in paradigm, from irrelevant to critical linkages, 
can trigger massive uncertainty, which can unleash destructive flights to quality.   
 As Benoit Mandelbrot, the mathematician perhaps best known for his work on fractal 
geometry, once drew a parallel from economics to storms, which can only be predicted after they 
form. Mandelbrot (2008, in a PBS NewsHour interview with Paul Solman on October 21, 2008) 
said:  “[T]he basis of weather forecasting is looking from a satellite and seeing a storm coming, 
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but not predicting that the storm will form. The behavior of economic phenomena is far more 
complicated than the behavior of liquids or gases.”  
Financial crises represent an extreme manifestation of complexity in macroeconomics, 
but this element probably permeates the entire business cycle, probably in part through 
fluctuations in the perceived probability that complexity and its consequences will be unleashed 
in the near future. These fluctuations could be endogenous and arising from local phenomena as 
highlighted by the formal complexity literature in physical sciences, but it also could be in 
response to a more conventional macroeconomic shock, such as an oil or aggregate demand 
shock, especially once these interact with more conventional financial-accelerator-type 
mechanisms (like those in Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989).  
The periphery has made some progress on parts of these mechanisms.  In Caballero and 
Simsek (2009a, b), we capture the idea of a sudden rise in complexity followed by widespread 
panic in the financial sector. In our model, banks normally collect basic information about their 
direct trading partners, which serves to assure them of the soundness of these relationships. 
However, when acute financial distress emerges in parts of the financial network, it is not 
enough to be informed about these direct trading partners, but it also becomes important for the 
banks to learn about the health of the partners of their trading partners to assess the chances of an 
indirect hit.  As conditions continue to deteriorate, banks must learn about the health of the 
trading partners of the trading partners of their trading partners, and so on. At some point, the 
cost of information gathering becomes too large and the banks, now facing enormous 
uncertainty, choose to withdraw from loan commitments and illiquid positions. Haldane (2009) 
masterfully captures the essence of the counterparty uncertainty problem that can arise in a 
complex modern financial network: “Knowing your ultimate counterparty’s risk then becomes 
akin to solving a high-dimension Sudoku puzzle.” A flight-to-quality ensues, and the financial 
crisis spreads.  
Taking a very different agency approach, and thinking about the specifics of the high-
frequency repo market, Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2009) show how a negative aggregate 
shock can cause debt to become information sensitive, impeding the efficient trading of assets.  
They point out that a security that pays off the same in all states of the world would be truly 
information insensitive.  Given limited liability, debt is the security that best approximates this 
information-insensitive security in the real world and provides the least incentive for the creation 
of private information.  However, when a bad shock concentrates agents’ beliefs on states of the 
world where debt does not pay off in full, agents would generate information before trading, 
which raises possibilities of adverse selection and impedes trade.  In this model, unexpectedly 
enough, opacity would reduce the extent of adverse selection and thus would encourage trade.  
In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008a), we illustrate with a model and examples of the 
amplification role of Knightian uncertainty, which refers to risk that cannot be measured and 
thus cannot be hedged. We pointed out that most flight-to-quality episodes are triggered by 
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unusual or unexpected events.  In 1970, the default by Penn Central Railroad’s prime-rated 
commercial paper caught the market by surprise.  In October 1987, the speed of the stock 
market’s decline led investors to question their models.  In the fall of 1998, the co-movement of 
Russian, Brazilian, and U.S. bond spreads surprised even sophisticated market participants.  In 
the recent financial crisis, another default on commercial paper—this time, by Lehman 
Brothers—created tremendous uncertainty.  The Lehman bankruptcy also caused profound 
disruption in the markets for credit default swaps and interbank loans.  The common aspects of 
investor behavior across these episodes―re-evaluation of models, conservatism, and 
disengagement from risky activities―indicate that these episodes involved Knightian uncertainty 
and not merely an increase in risk exposure. The extreme emphasis on tail outcomes and worst-
case scenarios in agents’ decision rules suggests aversion to this kind of uncertainty.7   
Novelty and uncertainty play an important role in these episodes; for example, the 
collapse of Amaranth hedge fund in 2006 caused little disruption to financial markets, whereas 
the losses at Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 contributed to worldwide crisis despite the 
rescue that was ultimately organized.  Some observers similarly argued that the oil price spikes 
of the 1970s were associated with much worse macroeconomic outcomes than those in the 2000s 
because agents came to expect volatility and hence the recent shocks were not as “earth-shaking” 
(Nordhaus, 2007).   
Haldane (2009) compares the recent financial crisis to the Severe Acute Respiratory 
System (SARS) outbreak earlier in the decade.  Morbidity and mortality rates from SARS were, 
“by epidemiological standards, modest.”  Yet SARS triggered a worldwide panic, reducing 
growth rates across Asia by 1–4 percentage points.  Parents kept their children home from school 
in Toronto, and Chinese restaurants in the United States were the targets of boycotts.  Faced with 
Knightian uncertainty, people conflated the possibility of catastrophe with catastrophe itself.   
 
 
                                                            
7 In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008b), we place the origins of the current crisis in this framework. We argue 
that perhaps the single largest change in the financial landscape over the last five years was in complex credit 
products: collateralized debt obligations, collateralized loan obligations, and the like.  Market participants had no 
historical record to measure how these financial structures would behave during a time of stress.  These two 
factors, complexity and lack of history, are the preconditions for rampant uncertainty. When the AAA subprime 
tranches began to experience losses, investors became uncertain about their investments. Had the uncertainty 
remained confined to subprime mortgage investments, the financial system could have absorbed the losses 
without too much dislocation.  However, investors started to question the valuation of the other credit 
products―not just mortgages―that had been structured in much the same way as subprime investments.  The 
result was a freezing up across the entire credit market.  The policy response to this initial freezing was timid, 
which kept the stress on the financial system alive until a full blown “sudden financial arrest” episode developed 
(after Lehman’s demise).  See Caballero (2009) for an analogy between sudden cardiac arrest and sudden financial 
arrest.  
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Some Policy Implications of a Confusing Environment 
  
The centrality of surprises in financial and economic crises seems discouraging since it 
would seem that it is difficult to fight something that is essentially impossible to predict, that 
keeps changing, and that is not understood until after it happens.   
However, some insights and systematic patterns are still possible. Certainly, it remains 
useful to think about policies or institutions that, by affecting factors like capital requirements, 
leverage, and maturity mismatches, can reduce the risk of crises. But financial and economic 
crises are likely to happen anyway, and so it would be useful to consider in advance how policy 
might respond, rather than needing to improvise.  
For example, one common pattern across all episodes of this kind is that the confusion 
triggers panics, and panics trigger spikes in the demand for explicit and implicit insurance. This 
observation immediately hints at the core of the required policy response: When a large systemic 
crisis of uncertainty strikes, the government must quickly provide access to reasonably priced 
balance-sheet insurance to fragile and systemically important institutions.  
 In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008a), we showed that in an episode of Knightian 
uncertainty, a government or central bank concerned with the aggregate will want to provide 
insurance against extreme events, even if it has no informational advantage over the private 
sector. The reason is that during a panic of this kind, each individual bank and investor fears 
being in a situation worse than the average, an event that cannot be true for the collective 
(individual agents know this aggregate constraint, but they assume they will be on the short end 
of things).  By providing a broad guarantee, the government gets the private sector to react more 
than one-for-one with this guarantee, because it also closes the gap between the true average and 
the average of panic-driven expectations.  Many of the actual programs implemented during the 
crisis had elements of guarantees, although they could probably have gone further.8 For example, 
Ross (2009) argues convincingly that the government should supply impairment guarantees 
along the lines of those used by the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac to improve the liquidity of the pool of legacy assets in banks balance sheets. Similarly, in 
Caballero and Kurlat (2009), we proposed a policy framework which would not only guarantee 
access to insurance in the event of a panic, but it would do so in a flexible manner that integrates 
the role of the government as an insurer of last resort with private sector information on the 
                                                            
8 Insurance programs during the crisis included: a temporary program created by the U.S. Treasury 
Department to insure money‐market funds; nonrecourse funding for the purchase of asset‐backed 
securities through the Term Asset‐Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF); and a temporary increase in 
deposit insurance from $100,000 to $250,000.  A notable example from outside the United States was 
the U.K. Asset Protection Scheme, which backed over half a trillion pounds in post‐haircut assets for two 
British banks.  See Caballero (2009), Madigan (2009), and IMF (2009).  
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optimal allocation of contingent insurance.9  For examples of related public guarantee programs 
and proposals, see Caballero (2009a, b); Mehrling and Milne (2008); and Milne (2009). 
A related argument is developed by Geanakoplos in a series of papers. Geanakoplos 
(2003, 2009) and Geanakoplos and Fostel (2008) highlight the role of margins in a theory of 
“leverage cycles.” In these models, the supply and demand for loans determines not only the 
interest rate, but also equilibrium leverage.  Geanakoplos (2010) suggests a three-pronged 
approach for government policy in the aftermath of a leverage cycle.  First, the government 
should address the precipitating cause of the crisis: the “scary bad news” and “massive 
uncertainty,” which in the particular case of the recent crisis, affected the housing market.  
Second, the government should create a lending facility to restore “reasonable” levels of 
leverage.  Third, the government should restore “optimistic” capital, for example, through 
bailouts (although Geanakoplos is more sanguine than I am about the efficacy of “bailouts with 
punishment,” as discussed in Caballero, 2010).   
For the purpose of this essay, more important than the specific proposals is the 
observation that the very acceptance of the key role played by complexity in significant 
macroeconomic events should be enough to point us in the direction of the kind of policies that 
can help to limit macroeconomic turbulence.  
 
Robustness 
 
 A number of researchers have sought to design policy frameworks that are robust to small 
modeling mistakes by the policymaker. For example, Hansen, Sargent, and their co-authors have 
made substantial progress in incorporating robust control techniques to economic policy analysis 
(for example, Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini, 1999; Hansen and Sargent, 2007; Cogley, Colacito, 
Hansen, and Sargent, 2008; Karantounias, Hansen, and Sargent, 2009). Woodford (2010) has 
explored the same broad issue in the context of the standard New-Keynesian model used in 
central banks’ research departments.  This strategy is clearly a step in the right direction, 
although I suspect the deviations they consider from the core models are still too local to capture 
the enormous uncertainties and confusion that policymakers face in realistic nontrivial scenarios. 
But this literature has many of the right words in it.  
                                                            
9 Under our proposal, the government would issue tradable insurance credits (TICs) which would be 
purchased by financial institutions, some of which would have minimum holding requirements. During a 
systemic crisis, each TIC would entitle its holder to attach a government guarantee to some of its assets. 
All regulated financial institutions would be allowed to hold and use TICs, and possibly hedge funds, 
private equity funds, and corporations as well. In principle, TICs could be used as a flexible and readily 
available substitute for many of the facilities that were created by the Federal Reserve during the crisis. 
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The natural next step for this robustness literature is to incorporate massive uncertainty. 
This step may also harbor some of the answers on how to deal with quantitative statements in a 
highly uncertain environment.  As a starting point, we probably need to relax the artificial micro-
foundation constraints imposed just for the sake of being able to generate “structural” general 
equilibrium simulations. When closing a quantitative model, there should be an explicit 
correspondence between the knowledge we assume in such closure and the state of our 
knowledge about such closure. This means replacing artificial structural equations for looser 
ones, or even for reduced-form data-relationships if this all that we really know. It is not nearly 
enough (although it is progress) to do Bayesian estimation of the dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model, for the absence of knowledge is far more fundamental than such an approach 
admits (for example, Fernandez-Villaverde, 2009, provides a good survey of this literature).  
We need to rework the mechanism the core currently uses to go from insights derived in 
the periphery to quantitative general equilibrium ones. There has been considerable progress in 
formalizing arguments for how dynamic adjustments happen, but while this is clearly progress, it 
is not a substitute for the kind of progress I advocate here, which is to acknowledge explicitly our 
degree of ignorance.10 There are many instances in which our knowledge of the true structural 
relationship is extremely limited. In such cases, the main problem is not in how to formalize an 
intuition but in the assumption that the structural relationship is known with precision.  
Superimposing a specific optimization paradigm is not the solution to this pervasive problem, as 
much of the difficulty lies precisely in not knowing which, and whose, optimization problem is 
to be solved. For this reason the solution is not simply to explore a wide range of parameters for 
a specific mechanism.  The problem is that we do not know the mechanism, not just that we 
don’t know its strength. 
But how do we go about doing policy analysis in models with some loosely specified 
blocks not pinned down by specific first-order conditions?  Welcome to the real world! This task 
is what actual policymakers face. Academic models often provide precise policy prescriptions 
because the structure, states, and mechanisms are sharply defined. In contrast, policymakers do 
not have these luxuries. Thoughtful policymakers use academic insights to think about the type 
of policies they may want to consider, but then try to understand the implications of such policies 
when some (or most) of the assumptions of the underlying theoretical model do not hold. 
                                                            
10 As Lucas (2003), following on a Friedman (1946) lead, points out:  “[T]he theory is never really solved. What are 
the predictions of Patinkin’s model? The model is too complicated to work them out. All the dynamics are the 
mechanical auctioneer dynamics that Samuelson introduced, where anything can happen. . . . You can see from his 
verbal discussion that he’s reading a lot of economics into these dynamics. What are people thinking? What are 
they expecting? . . . He’s really thinking about intertemporal substitution. He doesn’t know how to think about it, 
but he is trying to.”  In the specific example used here by Lucas, the Lucas–Rapping (1969) model, for example, did 
represent significant progress over the Patinkin modeling of labor dynamics. It solved the “how” part of the formal 
underpinning of Patinkin’s dynamics.  But as I point out in the text, this kind of solution is insufficient.  
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However, this kind of robustness analysis is nearly absent in our modeling. In this sense, and as I 
mentioned earlier, the work of Hansen and Sargent (2007) and others on robust control in 
policymaking points in the right direction, although I think we need to go much, much further in 
reducing the amount and type of knowledge policymakers and economic agents are assumed to 
possess. 
One primary driving force behind modern macroeconomics (both core and periphery) 
was an attempt to circumvent the Lucas critique—the argument that market participants take the 
policy regime into account and so estimates of economic parameters for one policy regime may 
well not be valid if the policy regime changes. If we now replace some first-order conditions by 
empirical relationships and their distributions, doesn’t this critique return to haunt us? The 
answer must be “yes,” at least to some extent. But if we do not have true knowledge about the 
relationship and its source, then assuming the wrong specific first-order condition can also be a 
source of misguided policy prescription. Both the ad-hoc model and the particular structural 
model make unwarranted specific assumptions about agents’ adaptation to the new policy 
environment. The Lucas critique is clearly valid, but for many (most?) policy questions we 
haven’t yet found the solution—we only have the pretense of a solution.  
Ultimately, for policy prescriptions, it is important to assign different weights to those 
that follow from blocks over which we have true knowledge, and those that follow from very 
limited knowledge. Some of this has already been done in the asset pricing literature: for 
example, Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2007) use arbitrage theory to constrain an otherwise 
nonstructural econometric study of the yield curve and Taylor’s rule. Perhaps a similar route can 
be followed in macroeconomics to gauge the order of magnitude of some key effects and 
mechanisms, which can then be combined with periphery insights to generate back-of-the-
envelope-type calculations. For now, we shouldn't pretend that we know more than this, although 
this is no reason to give up hope. We have made enormous progress over the last few decades in 
the formalization of macroeconomics. We just got a little carried away with the beautiful 
structures that emerged from this process.  
 
The Pretense of Knowledge  
 
 The root cause of the poor state of affairs in the field of macroeconomics lies in a 
fundamental tension in academic macroeconomics between the enormous complexity of its 
subject and the micro-theory-like precision to which we aspire.   
This tension is not new.  The old institutional school concluded that the task was 
impossible and hence not worth formalizing in mathematical terms (for example, Samuels, 1987, 
and references therein). Narrative was the chosen tool, as no mathematical model could capture 
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the richness of the world that is to be explained. However, this approach did not solve the 
conundrum; it merely postponed it.  The modern core of macroeconomics swung the pendulum 
to the other extreme, and has specialized in quantitative mathematical formalizations of a precise 
but largely irrelevant world.  This approach has not solved the conundrum either. I wish the 
solution was to be found somewhere in between these polar opposites, but it is not clear what “in 
between” means for a range that has a framework based on  verbal discussions of the real world 
on one end and one based on quantitative analysis of an “alternative” world, on the other.  
The periphery of macroeconomics has much to offer in terms of specific insights and 
mechanisms, but to fulfill the ambition of the core we need to change the paradigm to go from 
these insights on the parts to the behavior of the whole. It is not about embedding these into 
some version of the canonical real business cycle model. It is, among other things, about 
capturing complex interactions and the confusion that they can generate.  
From a policy perspective, the specifics of a crisis are only known once the crisis starts. 
For this reason, my sense is that, contrary to the hope of policymakers and regulators, there is 
limited scope for policy that can in advance eliminate the risk or costs of financial crisis, beyond 
some common-sense measures (like capital requirements for financial institutions) and very 
general public–private insurance arrangements (like deposit insurance). By the time a true 
financial crisis is underway, the immediately relevant policy issues are no longer about whether 
intervention might breed moral hazard, but about a socially wasteful reluctance to invest and to 
hire, and the extent to which predatory trading or fire sales can be minimized.  
Going back to our macroeconomic models, we need to spend much more effort in 
understanding the topology of interactions in real economies. The financial sector and its recent 
struggles have made this need vividly clear, but this issue is certainly not exclusive to this sector.  
The challenges are big, but macroeconomists can no longer continue playing internal 
games. The alternative of leaving all the important stuff to the “policy”-types and informal 
commentators cannot be the right approach. I do not have the answer.  But I suspect that 
whatever the solution ultimately is, we will accelerate our convergence to it, and reduce the 
damage we do along the transition, if we focus on reducing the extent of our pretense-of-
knowledge syndrome.  
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